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Abstract 
Extensive public debate is being waged across mature welfare states as to 
whether social services are best provided by the state or the market. This 
article examines developments in Early Childhood Education and Care 
(ECEC) policy in Sweden and the United Kingdom, identifying trends towards 
marketization and universalization of ECEC that suggest a complex picture of 
competing policy logics and goals in the restructuring of welfare states. This 
article first discusses two models of early-years provision, the market model, 
and the universal model, outlining underlying assumptions, tensions, and 
implications of market and state provision of ECEC. A comparison of recent 
reforms in Sweden and the UK highlights how similar ideas and trends play 
out differently in different national contexts. In Sweden an integrated public 
‘educare’ programme gradually developed over time, and market mechanisms 
introduced in the 1990s have so far had limited effect on the system overall. In 
the UK ideas about universal early childhood education became influential as 
part of a new social-investment agenda in the 1990s but have, owing to their 
restricted implementation, not fundamentally altered the existing childcare 
market. Historical policy trajectories continue to matter, yet tensions and 
incoherencies between policies can open spaces for change. 
 
Keywords: Early childhood education and care, marketization, universalism, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, social investment 
 
 
Introduction 
The strengthening of economic principles in the organization and delivery of 
social services has been a recurrent theme in recent public-sector reform 
throughout mature welfare states (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2000). This article 
examines changes in Early Childhood Education and Care (ECEC) policy in 
Sweden and the United Kingdom since the 1990s, and asks to what extent 
these developments reflect general trends of marketization. Sweden and the 
UK are commonly characterized as ‘universalist’ and ‘residual’ welfare states, 
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respectively, which reflects their markedly different welfare-state designs (see 
e.g., Sainsbury, 1991; Wincott, 2006). The generous public ECEC system in 
Sweden and the historical marginalization of childcare policy in the UK fit the 
picture well. Comparing developments around ECEC in these two contrasting 
cases helps highlight how similar trends and ideas play out differently in 
different national contexts. In both countries the marketization of early-years 
services has taken place with competition and for-profit provision playing a 
new or enhanced role. However, this is not the only trend in ECEC reform: in 
the same period public responsibility for and universal access to early-years 
services have been extended.  
 
Such state-led service expansion may seem surprising in a general climate of 
financial austerity and retrenchment, and stands in tension with the neo-liberal 
underpinnings of the ideas of New Public Management that have influenced 
both countries (Blomqvist, 2004; Naumann & Crouch, forthcoming). A number 
of scholars have linked developments around ECEC to the broader 
restructuring of welfare states towards a new ‘paradigm’ of ‘social investment’ 
(Taylor-Gooby, 2008; Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2006). In this concept, early-
years services play a central role in making parents and children productive 
workers in the present and future, which implies increased state involvement 
as a means for ultimately economic ends. It is important to note, however, that 
the various policy initiatives around ECEC in recent years cannot all be 
reduced to economic intentions. The trends of marketization and 
universalization in ECEC services do not add up to a coherent new welfare-
state design, but present a contradictory mixture of policy goals and solutions. 
By disentangling the various developments around ECEC, this article 
suggests that, rather than a move from an ‘old’ towards a ‘new’ welfare state, 
what we may be witnessing is the maturation of ‘old’ policies alongside the 
pursuit of new agendas. Recent ECEC reforms in Sweden and the UK indicate 
some change in policy principles, while remaining enmeshed in the historical 
policy legacies of each country.  
 
The first part of the article provides an analytical discussion of two contrasting 
approaches to ECEC services – the market model and the universal model – 
as a framework for understanding the tensions and contradictions underlying 
ECEC reform. Thereafter, developments in ECEC policy in Sweden and the 
UK are examined. First, the two post-war ECEC systems are briefly outlined to 
help identify continuity and change in ECEC policy since the 1990s in the 
analysis that follows. The subsequent comparative discussion highlights 
tensions inherent in different reforms and the extent to which they have altered 
the pattern of national ECEC provision. The last section draws some lessons 
from the comparison of ECEC reforms with respect to welfare-state change in 
general. 
Competing models of early-years provision 
Recent academic debate about welfare-state reform in Sweden has revolved 
around the question of whether the introduction of market mechanisms in 
social services has led to the abandoning of universalism as guiding principle 
of the Swedish welfare regime (Blomqvist, 2004; Bergh, 2004). In the British 
case marketization trends are seen to be more in line with the traditionally 
restrained and targeted nature of state involvement in people’s welfare in this 
‘liberal’ or ‘residual’ welfare state (Wincott, 2006). Here, new commitments to 
universal provision, such as in preschool education, have been dubbed a 
‘quiet revolution’ (Smith, 2007). It is noteworthy, however, that the principle of 
universalism has always been part of the Beveridgean post-WWII welfare 
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state, for example, in National Health Insurance or the national pension. Such 
observations invite a focus on the dimensions of ‘selectivity’ and ‘universalism’ 
when assessing changes in ECEC policy in Sweden and the UK. The 
discussion about ‘market’ versus ‘state’ in social-service delivery can be cast 
within these specific dimensions. However, this debate also has broader 
scope, because it considers not only the type of policy instruments chosen 
and level of generosity, but also different perspectives on the types of relations 
social services do, or should, entail.  
The market model  
The ECEC market is constituted by the exchange relationship between 
individual purchasers (parents) and private, commercial providers (firms or 
corporations). Both purchasers and providers are assumed to behave as self-
interested actors: parents by seeking the best ECEC solutions and providers 
by seeking profit-maximization. The ‘pure’ childcare market is also assumed to 
be self-regulatory: the size of the childcare sector, the available types of 
services, the prices and the quality will reflect demand; consumer choice and 
competition produce an incentivizing mechanism in that providers offering 
unsatisfactory services will be squeezed out of the market. The expected 
outcome is an ECEC sector that both displays a high degree of diversity, 
which reflects parents’ differing preferences, and delivers high-quality, cost-
effective ECEC services. 
 
The appeal of the market model to pressure groups (parents) and 
policymakers lies in its responsiveness to consumers and its promises of 
efficiency. It also allows governments to refrain from explicit normative 
decisions about who should be using ECEC services because the market is 
supposed to be demand-driven.
1
 A core assumption on which the market is 
premised is that ‘buyers’ are well-informed about the ‘product’ they purchase 
and are free to enter or exit a transaction. In practice, however, there are 
various constraints on parental choice, constraints which are implicated in 
dysfunctional market developments (see also Ball & Vincent, 2005). First, 
since the cost of ECEC services is borne by the parent-purchasers, access to 
services is determined by parents’ resources. Some parents will be unable to 
afford ECEC services altogether, and others will have to content themselves 
with inadequate solutions. Secondly, parents tend to be logistically and 
geographically constrained. Since commercial providers are likely to target 
buyers with the highest purchasing power, geographical service imbalances 
may be the result, with good and varied availability in affluent urban areas and 
scarce or unsatisfactory provision in disadvantaged or remote areas. ‘Need’ – 
foremost parents’ need for childcare in order to hold down a job – is the most 
immediate limitation to ‘free choice’. If the need is strong, providers may 
become less responsive to demands and expectations, and might, for 
example, trade quality for efficiency because they will get their customers 
anyway. Lastly, not all parents hold the necessary expert knowledge that 
enables them to assess the suitability and quality of early-years services. The 
ECEC market can, therefore, be seen as being highly selective, where 
affordability, availability, and the advertisement power of firms directly 
influence parental choice, and in practice these factors leave many with little 
choice at all.  
 
                                                     
1
 While the market model is grounded in normative assumptions about social relations, 
public debate has tended to focus on its instrumental aspects. This is beneficial for 
governments since the declining stability in voter-alignments have made value 
statements politically more risky. 
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No such ‘pure’ ECEC market seems to exist anywhere. No welfare state dares 
to leave the provision of early-years services fully to market forces because 
children are considered a particularly vulnerable group in society in need of 
special protection. Thus, even in countries such as the US or the UK, where 
‘childcare markets’ are said to exist, these are in fact strongly state-regulated 
(Penn 2010). Secondly, children are not only the ‘private pleasure’ of their 
parents but carry certain ‘public-good’ characteristics. Welfare states have 
always had an interest in influencing the ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’ of the future 
generation of citizens, workers, and soldiers via a range of social policies (see 
e.g., Myrdal, 1945; SOU, 1972; HMT, 2001). In some countries such as 
France and Sweden, the potential of early-years services to impact on 
children’s health and socialization, as well as on family and fertility behaviour, 
has received attention already in the early twentieth century (Naumann, 2006); 
in other countries such as the UK this focus has more recent origins (Lloyd, 
2008; Smith, 2007). Broader goals such as poverty alleviation or the 
reconciliation of family and work cannot easily be achieved through the market 
owing to its selection effects, and this difficulty has led states to intervene in 
ECEC provision. Thirdly, the increasing recognition of young children’s right to 
educational opportunities, as reflected in Article 28 of the UN convention of the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC), has galvanized governmental action (UN, 1989). 
For these reasons, welfare states are involved in the regulation, funding, and 
provision of early-years’ services, albeit to varying degrees. In some countries 
such as Sweden, state involvement in ECEC has approached a ‘universal 
model’, as outlined below. 
The universal model  
In the universal model, provision and funding of all ECEC services are public. 
ECEC in this model is understood as a social right – a right that extends to 
both parents and children as actual users of ECEC services
2
 – meaning that 
access is open to all children irrespective of socio-economic background and, 
in a pure model, free at point of delivery (see also Bergh, 2004). The social-
rights character implies that social risks associated with the early years – such 
as parents’ need for extra-familial childcare, children’s special or general 
needs for good care, and learning environments – are covered collectively via 
citizens’ tax contributions. The public responsibility for ECEC in turn implies a 
public interest, and public interest thus entails public debate over the content 
and aims of ECEC services, which connects with broader societal goals that 
are most likely guided by dominant cultural norms.  
 
The appeal of this model to pressure groups (children’s advocates, 
educational specialists, women’s movements) is its emphasis on citizenship, 
that is, the manner in which ECEC extends to wider society and can be 
claimed as inalienable right. Its appeal to governments is state control and its 
integrative potential. The possibility of pursuing broader goals through ECEC 
services directly influence the behaviour of families and foster social cohesion. 
But the universal model also has shortcomings because the principle of 
universalism may produce highly standardized services to ensure equal 
access and availability across a country. In ‘real-world’ contexts this may imply 
an unsatisfactory fit between available services and local or individual needs. 
The focus on children and their rights implies an obligation to certain quality 
standards of service provision. Depending on how ‘quality’ is socially defined 
                                                     
2
 In the market model the children’s position is more ambivalent. While they are users 
of ECEC services, they are also the ‘product’ of the transaction between parents and 
service providers. Further, the main focus in the market model rests on parents as 
service-purchasers. 
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this can be very costly for welfare states. Under conditions of economic 
constraint, tensions may arise between ‘universal access’ and ‘quality’ where 
the latter may be traded for the former. Furthermore, by reproducing dominant 
norms and ideals about children and social relations (e.g., about gender roles) 
in the types of services offered, certain understandings and forms of ECEC 
will be marginalized or excluded. There is thus an inbuilt tension in the 
universal model between universalism and citizen’s individual needs and 
preferences, a tension that has intensified over last decades as advanced 
societies have become more pluralist and diverse.  
 
To sum up, both the ‘market model’ and the ‘universal model’ of ECEC 
provision carry theoretical appeal while also leading to inadequacies in 
practice. The market is expected to produce responsive, diverse, and efficient 
ECEC services, but is highly selective; the universal system is expected to 
provide equal access and opportunities for all children, yet may become 
uniform and unresponsive. ‘Quality’ of services can in practice become a 
problem with both models. When examining recent national ECEC reforms we 
should thus not expect unidirectional developments towards either market or 
state provision, but policy responses that attempt to cater to an array of goals 
by combining diverse policy instruments and logics.   
 
An increased policy orientation towards the ECEC market model, termed 
‘marketization’ in the discussion below, could happen along one or more of the 
following dimensions: 
 
- A decrease in state regulation, such as the relaxation of inspection 
regimes or standardized quality requirements (e.g., staff-to-child 
ratios, health, and safety). 
- A decrease in state funding and subsidies to suppliers or service 
users. 
- A decline in the proportion of public or publicly funded services in 
favour of for-profit providers. 
- The introduction of market mechanisms such as choice and 
competition, and a strengthened focus on efficiency and economic 
goals. 
Not all developments of privatization necessarily imply marketization: 
independent charities and other non-profit organizations may also provide 
private services. Privatization is linked to marketization whenever it involves 
an increase in individual risk and costs to service users (i.e., reduction in state 
funding) and where non-profit providers are encouraged to act like firms.  
 
The ‘universalization’ of ECEC means extended access to good-quality 
services independent of service users’ socio-economic background. It can 
also include a strengthened framework for public funding and regulation and 
the recognition of public responsibility for children’s upbringing. Yet not every 
increase in state involvement necessarily equals a development towards the 
universal model. Targeted measures are likely to underscore socio-
economically stratified access to services; differentiated parental fees, on the 
other hand, may support the principle of universalism. Nor does ‘universal 
access’ of itself imply programme generosity or comprehensiveness, even 
though these aspects are commonly associated with each other in 
characterizations of Nordic welfare states (Bergh, 2004), for it does not define 
the extent of membership. In practice universal ECEC policies may be of quite 
limited character, guaranteeing access only to certain age groups of children 
(e.g. three- to five-year-olds) and for certain times (e.g., part-time).  
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There is thus no simple trade-off between market provision and universal 
ECEC – more ‘market’ does not necessarily mean less ‘state’ – and no linear 
relationship exists between the two. Rather, both models are outlined here to 
highlight the shaping of ECEC systems by different and competing logics and 
mechanisms: parental preferences versus citizenship; competition versus 
public planning; individual interests versus collective interest. The ways in 
which trends of ‘marketization’ and ‘universalization’ have manifested 
themselves in Swedish and British ECEC will be examined next. 
ECEC policy developments in Sweden and the UK 
Historical Background 
 
During the post-WWII decades ECEC services were equally scarce in Sweden 
and the UK, the male breadwinner model was dominant in both countries, and 
small children were seen to be best cared for by their biological mother. In 
Sweden in 1968, two per cent of children aged four, 11 per cent of the five-
year-olds, and 43 per cent of six-year-olds were in childcare and preschool 
programs (Naumann, 2006). In the UK in 1965, two per cent of three to four-
year-olds had access to state-provided childcare and 11 per cent of children 
had some kind of out-of-home care (Penn, 2009, p.117).
3
 In the following 
decades ECEC services in Sweden expanded dramatically on the basis of 
strong demand by working parents, radically changing social norms about 
gender roles and children’s place in society, and a high welfare-state 
commitment. In the UK, on the other hand, state involvement in ECEC service 
provision remained minimal, where the raising of children was defined as a 
private family matter and the norm of the male breadwinner remained 
dominant. 
 
Sweden 
In Sweden, a unitary public ECEC system for children aged one to six was 
established in the early 1970s. Designed as a collective full-day service, 
modern Swedish ECEC was intended to fulfil a wide range of functions: to 
provide good-quality day care while also offering pedagogically sound learning 
spaces; to enhance gender equality by supporting the reconciliation of work 
and family life; to mitigate class differences by offering children equal 
educational opportunities from an early age; and to support economic growth 
and welfare-state sustainability by bringing as many parents as possible into 
the labour market. The foundations for this public ECEC system were laid in 
1972 by an extensive state investigation that detailed major aspects of these 
services, drawing on psychological child development research, sociological, 
and economic theory, and by synthesizing political goals with feminist thinking 
on childcare that had been debated since the 1920s (SOU, 1972; Naumann, 
2006).  Universal availability of public ECEC grew to become a central political 
promise of the Swedish Social Democratic government (Naumann, 2006).  
 
                                                     
3
 Children in Britain normally enter school at the age of five, while their Swedish 
counterparts do so at the age of seven. 
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The universalization of ECEC services in Sweden was a gradual process that 
took shape over several decades. In 1973 the state for the first time formalized 
its responsibility for ECEC by obliging municipalities to provide free early-
years services to preschool children, albeit at that point only for six-year-olds. 
In 1976 a bill was passed with the ambitious plan to expand ECEC with 100 
000 new day-care places and 50 000 after-school places (Antman, 1996). In 
1980 the provision of ECEC services was legally placed under municipal 
responsibility, but with substantial financial contributions by the central state. 
In 1985 a new expansion programme was passed with the aim to provide by 
1991 ECEC for all children aged one-and-a-half to six years whose parents 
were gainfully employed (Antman, 1996). The state’s financial commitment to 
its expansion plans was considerable: social expenditure for ECEC rose from 
0.15 per cent in 1963-1964 to 2.75 per cent in 1987-1988 (Hinfors, 1990, 
p.49). Between 1975 and 1990 ECEC services expanded from a coverage of 
17 per cent to 52 per cent of children aged one to six (Bergqvist & Nyberg, 
2001, p.243). Despite this massive expansion, the demand for places grew 
faster in line with women’s mass-entry into the labour market; childcare 
queues were long, and places were generally reserved for children of working 
parents or for children with special needs (Naumann, 2006).  
 
United Kingdom 
In the UK ECEC services developed slowly in the absence of an explicit 
childcare policy in a mixed economy with an administrative bifurcation into 
care and nursery education. The Department of Health (DHSS) was 
responsible for childcare, mainly developing targeted programmes aimed at 
children at risk, and the Department for Education (DfEE) was in charge of 
preschool education. The implementation of programmes and the levels of 
day-care and nursery-school provision were left to local authorities (LAs), but 
limited financial support from central government meant that LAs’ actions were 
restricted. During the 1970s the national government started to take greater 
interest in ECEC, especially in preschool education, and a gradual increase in 
public nursery schools took place. In 1972, the then education minister, 
Margaret Thatcher, announced expansion plans for preschools to provide 
sufficient places for all three- and four-year-olds according to demand by 
1982. However, these plans were quickly scrapped when the Conservatives 
returned to power under Thatcher in 1979 (Randall, 2002). Owing to lack of 
available ECEC services and the growing need, parents started to organize 
play-groups and parent co-operatives, and private day care and childminding, 
both in registered and unregistered forms, expanded considerably (Penn, 
2009).  
 
Contrary to feminist pressure in the 1980s to open the childcare system to all 
children, the Thatcher and Major governments focused on preschool 
education as part of a broader agenda to reform the educational system along 
the lines of marketization and centralization (Ruggie, 1984; Naumann/Crouch, 
forthcoming). Nursery schools did not have to be organized through the state 
educational system, but a new voucher scheme led many primary schools to 
set up ‘reception classes’ for four-year-olds to claim the voucher money 
(Penn, 2009, p.120). The government also initiated a series of ‘Under-Fives 
Initiatives’ in which it worked directly with voluntary providers, therewith 
bypassing the LAs (Randall, 2002, p.225). The responsibility for the 
organization of day care was left to LAs, mainly as a measure for families in 
need, and the 1989 Childcare Act set out an inspection and standards regime 
under which private childcare providers had to be registered and inspected at 
local governmental level. As a consequence of these policy developments, 
public childcare places remained very scarce for children under the age of 
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three, with a coverage of two per cent in 1993, while (part-time) nursery 
schools for three- to four-year-olds expanded considerably to cover 60 per 
cent of this age group (Bahle & Pfenning, 2001). Private ECEC services 
increased more than threefold, and ECEC service provision fragmented, 
resulting in considerable regional and local variations in the availability and the 
quality of services (Randall, 2002). 
 
By the beginning of the 1990s Sweden had an extensive public ECEC system 
with a broad remit, while in the UK a mixed economy of ECEC services 
existed with a clear distinction between care and preschool education 
alongside an increasingly dominant role for private providers. Albeit with some 
delay, both ECEC systems had developed in line with the general welfare-
state trajectories of the two countries: generous public-service provision in 
Sweden based on the principles of equality and universalism and the dual-
earner family norm; and limited state involvement in day care in the UK, 
reflecting a preference for means-testing and low de-commodification, along 
with an ambivalence towards mothers’ employment characteristic of the British 
welfare state. Part-time preschool education had been recognized as 
desirable; however, at the same time as preschool services received more 
attention by the state, they became part of new marketization trends within the 
educational system. Since the 1990s changes have taken place in the 
Swedish and the British ECEC system that both strengthen and challenge 
these earlier developments. 
 
ECEC reforms in the 1990s and 2000s 
Sweden 
Criticisms concerning the legitimacy and efficiency of large, uniform and 
centrally led public services had mounted during the 1970s and 1980s. These 
concerns, together with the spreading of New Public Management (NPM) 
ideas, led in the 1990s to the decentralization of public-sector governance and 
the opening up of the welfare system to private providers of every kind (with 
non-profit and for-profit orientations) (Blomqvist, 2004). In 1991 the newly 
elected centre-right government promised a ‘choice revolution’ that would 
increase diversity and economic efficiency in public services. The old top-
down, regulation-heavy relationship between the central state and 
municipalities was replaced by a system of governance by objectives for key 
social services, and detailed earmarked state funding to municipalities was 
replaced by block grants. Deregulation and decentralization gave the 
municipalities considerable freedom to decide over the organization and 
delivery of social services, including ECEC.  
 
Until the 1990s, private ECEC services hardly existed beyond a few facilities 
with specific pedagogical traditions (e.g., Montessori, Rudolf Steiner) or 
facilities set up by parent co-operatives owing to a lack of available public 
childcare. In 1984 the Social Democrats passed a law prohibiting commercial 
childcare services in response to one large corporation’s attempts to develop 
such nurseries. However, in 1991 the then conservative government removed 
most of the restrictions on the establishment of non-municipal, private ECEC 
services, and from 1992 onward even for-profit providers were given access to 
public funding (Strandbrink & Pestoff, 2006, p.43). Following these 
developments, the number of non-municipal ECEC facilities increased from 
500 in 1988 to 3113 in 2002, providing ten per cent of places for children aged 
one to six. The number of for-profit providers on all private facilities was low 
throughout the 1990s but increased during the 2000s; by 2008 the proportion 
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of privately provided places had increased to 14.2 per cent (SOS, 2009). 
Today, for-profit ECEC makes up a bit less than ten per cent of Swedish 
ECEC places overall, but large differences exist between municipalities, with 
commercial ECEC being hardly existent in some whilst being widespread in 
others (Skolverket 2010).  
 
In the mid-1990s, Sweden was hit by a severe economic crisis. Nevertheless, 
state funding of ECEC remained constant in this period: public expenditure for 
ECEC and after-school care was 3.78 billion euros in 1990, 3.67 in 1995, and 
3.81 billion euros in 1997. However, the demand for childcare also rose 
sharply in the 1990s, leading to renewed massive service expansion, from 
around 330 000 places in 1990 to over 700 000 places in 2000. This 
expansion that took place without additional funding raised public concern 
about a potential reduction of quality of early-years services, as indicated in 
the deteriorating child-staff ratio from 4.4 in 1990 to 5.7 in 1998. However, this 
trend was reversed through earmarked state grants to increase staff numbers 
in preschools in the 2000s; in 2006 the staff-child ratio was 5.1 (Skolverket, 
2008, p.39). It has also been noted that changes in quality are difficult to 
assess due to other developments (Bergqvist & Nyberg, 2001). In the same 
period a professionalization of ECEC staff took place, with an increase in the 
proportion of staff holding university degrees, rising to 54 per cent in 2000 
(Skolverket, 2000, p.49). Furthermore, service integration on the municipal 
level between school education, ECEC, and after-school care intensified in 
ways that allowed for more efficient use of resources, such as the sharing of 
facilities and activities (Cohen et al., 2004). In 1998 a preschool class for six-
year-olds was introduced as part of the school system, and consequently this 
age group was removed from the ECEC system’s planning and costing. Many 
municipalities also responded to financial constraints by off-loading costs to 
parents. In 1990 parental fees covered ten per cent of total ECEC costs; by 
1999 this figure had increased to 18 per cent (Bergqvist & Nyberg, 2001, 
p.265).  
 
These changes – decentralization, deregulation, and privatization – led to 
considerable differences between municipalities with respect to variety, 
availability, parental fees, and quality of ECEC services (Strandbrink & 
Pestoff, 2006, p.44; Cohen et al. 2004). However, policy reforms implemented 
during the latter part of the 1990s and the early 2000s display attempts to 
reverse some of these developments, along with a renewed emphasis on 
universalism and a retrieval of central state control. The pedagogical focus of 
early-years services was strengthened by transferring the responsibility for 
these services from the Social Department to the Education Department. In 
2001 a new system of integrated teacher training for school teachers, 
preschool, and after-school pedagogues further augmented the educational 
standing of preschool staff (Cohen et al., 2004). In 1998 a national curriculum 
for children aged one to five was introduced that not only outlined the 
pedagogical remit of early-years services (which is broader than the 
understanding of ‘education’ in the UK), but also pointed to their societal 
mission of transmitting democratic values and practices (Lpfö, 1998). 
Following this educational logic, in 1999 a statutory right to early childhood 
education was extended to all children, including children of unemployed and 
non-working parents. The 1999 bill obliged municipalities to provide a place for 
every child from one year of age within three months of application. In 
addition, preschool for four- to five-year-olds was made free of charge. And in 
2000 the national government set upper limits to municipal parental fees, the 
so-called ‘max tax’, to ensure affordability for all parents: parental fees are 
differentiated according to income, but do not exceed three per cent of family 
income for the first child and two per cent for the second child (Skolverket, 
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2007). By the beginning of 2000, the Swedish ECEC system had become fully 
universal. Today, almost half of one-year-olds, 91.3 per cent of two-year-olds 
and 97 per cent of three- to five-year-olds attend ECEC services (SOS, 2010). 
 
United Kingdom 
When the Labour Party came to power in 1997, it announced radical changes 
in the direction of childcare policy, committing itself to providing sufficient and 
affordable ECEC services. The then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon 
Brown, declared in his budgetary speech that childcare would be an integral 
part of New Labour’s economic policy, and in 1998 the government produced 
the first National Childcare Strategy (DfES, 1998). Its aims were to combat 
child poverty and social exclusion by bringing parents into paid work and 
supporting children's 'early learning'. Linking ECEC explicitly to the 
reconciliation of work and family life also meant a new direction in family policy 
because it promoted the dual-earner family (Lewis, 2003; Lloyd, 2008). In 
addition a ‘Sure Start’ programme was introduced in 1999 to provide public 
early-years services in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Declaring the 
desirability of collective childcare was indeed a radical shift from previous 
governmental policy. But with the central focus on low-income parents and 
their children, the New Labour government remained committed to their 
Conservative predecessor's focus on reducing welfare dependency, albeit with 
a more active role for the state. 
 
In its 2001 manifesto the Labour party promised to create 1.6 million new 
childcare places and in 2004 the government presented a Ten-Year Strategy 
(HMT, 2004) that set up an extensive policy framework for the development of 
ECEC services; it became formalized in the 2006 Childcare Act (applicable to 
England). With their expansion plans, New Labour continued and reinforced 
the trends of marketization in the ECEC sector that had taken place earlier. 
While the Childcare Act set out how local LAs were to assess, coordinate, and 
inspect public and private ECEC services, it also made explicit that LAs were 
only to provide services themselves if there were no private alternatives 
available (HMT, 2004). The government initiated various supply-side 
measures of ‘pump priming’ and start-up funding, which encouraged private 
providers to establish ECEC services, but it did not increase state funding for 
LAs to fulfil their obligations. State expenditure on ECEC increased 
moderately from a low 0.2 per cent of GDP in 1998-1999 to 0.4 per cent in 
2003 (OECD, 2005, pp.109f.). A new system of Childcare Tax Credits was 
introduced to help working parents with childcare costs. These demand-side 
subsidies covered up to 80 per cent of childcare costs for low-income families, 
but quickly decreased with growing income to ten per cent or less for middle-
income families. With these policies New Labour continued the commitment to 
restrict public-service provision and to strengthen parental choice and service 
plurality via market mechanisms.  
 
However, other aspects of the Childcare Act and further initiatives in the 2000s 
did not follow this market logic but instead emphasized the importance of 
early-years provision for all children’s education and well-being, placing these 
services in a wider community context. With the 2006 Act, the state for the first 
time announced its legal responsibility to provide ECEC. It obliged LAs to offer 
a free preschool place to every child aged 3-4 for 2.5 hours a day, as well as 
sufficient childcare and after-school care for children of all ages whose parents 
were at work or in training. A preschool curriculum for three- to four-year-olds 
was introduced, partly to improve educational standards in preschool settings, 
and in addition to integrate care and education, since the national curriculum 
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was also intended for facilities offering day care for this age group. The 
creation of a new Department for Children, Schools, and Families responsible 
for all child- and family-related services further emphasized this more holistic 
view of the child that linked care, education, and wider aspects. In England the 
state-run Sure Start centres were expanded to become Children’s Centres 
comprising, besides ECEC, a wide range of family and community services 
such as parenting classes, health care, citizen’s advice, and employment 
bureaus. The Children’s Centres were to be located primarily in disadvantaged 
areas, but were to expand gradually to every ‘local community’ in England 
(Ball & Vincent, 2005; Lloyd, 2008).  
 
Following these initiatives, ECEC services expanded considerably in the UK. 
In 2004 35 per cent of children aged zero to two years and 86 per cent three- 
to five-year-olds had an ECEC place (Plantenga et al., 2008, p.30); among 
four-year-olds there is today almost full coverage. The expansion of places for 
three-year-olds took place mainly in the private service sector, and, as a 
consequence, the proportion of publicly provided places decreased from 85 
per cent in 2000 to 47 per cent in 2004 in England and Wales. The majority 
(81 per cent) of four-year-olds attended public settings, mainly through 
reception classes in primary schools (Brewer et al., 2005, p.166). Devolution 
in the UK at the end of the 1990s meant that ECEC services became the 
responsibility of the respective nations, and differences in policy orientation do 
exist, particularly between England and Scotland (Wincott, 2006; Cohen et al., 
2004). From the standpoint of comparisons between countries, however, the 
similarities in the structure of the ECEC sector prevail, not least because 
important subsidies such as Tax Credits are operated by the central 
government.   
 
New Labour have described their targeted approach as ‘progressive 
universalism’ (HMT, 2001) –a definition that is notably not based on ideas of 
public-service provision for all, irrespective of socio-economic background. 
The Labour government’s expansion efforts underscore the aim of a gradual 
universalization of the ECEC system. However, a clear tension exists between 
these intentions and the chosen policy instruments: Sure Start and Children 
Centres target geographical areas rather than granting a right to every child, 
and thus actual access to ECEC services is not guaranteed. Nor do these 
Centres necessarily reach every child at risk or from a low-income 
background, since locations of disadvantage and individual circumstances of 
disadvantage do not neatly match.
4
 The very part-time nature of free 
preschool for three- to four-year-olds also hampers attempts to support the 
reconciliation of family and work. Most working parents need alternative care 
arrangements beyond the nursery school, and many are logistically not able to 
use preschools at all but rely on predominantly private and expensive day 
care. Parents in the UK spend on average a third of their income on childcare 
costs, the highest among OECD countries (OECD, 2007), and for many 
families the financial burden is even heavier. In London the average weekly 
cost for 25 hours of nursery care for a child under two is currently £118.54 
(Daycare Trust, 2011). The affordability of childcare thus remains a significant 
problem for many families, in practice hindering many mothers of small 
children from entering the labour market (Ball/Vincent, 2005, p.561). Informal 
care remains the dominant form of extra-familial childcare; in the early 2000s 
70 per cent of employed mothers relied on informal childcare (Lewis, 2003, 
p.232). The quality of ECEC services is another problematic area. In nursery 
schools for three- to four-year-olds there are trained teachers, yet the children 
                                                     
4
 Tunstall and Lupton (2003) have even found that most poor children did not live in 
disadvantaged areas. 
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are subjected to high teacher-to-pupil ratios and have to adapt to school 
education-oriented classroom settings. For day-care staff, training 
requirements as well as pay are minimal, and this leads to high rates of 
turnover in these settings and leaves the question open as to whether there is 
sufficient competence to implement the national early-years curricula. These 
tensions are expected to increase as the newly elected coalition government 
in 2010 has announced their intention to reduce the scope of public Sure Start 
Centres, providing mainly part-time preschool education, and a refocusing of 
childcare policy targeting disadvantaged children. 
Discussion: ECEC services between marketization and 
universalization 
Over the last twenty-years the Swedish and British ECEC systems have 
undergone fundamental changes with respect to the quantity of available 
places, underlying rationale, and governance structure. Do these changes 
also reflect general welfare-state trends towards increased marketization? The 
answer is both yes and no: market mechanisms have been introduced in both 
ECEC systems but only within certain dimensions and to varying degrees. At 
the same time, early-years provision has been universalized following a very 
different ‘public-good’ logic, again to varying degrees in the two countries, that 
has older roots than the recent market-drive in social-services reform.  
 
In the UK during the 1980s and in Sweden somewhat later in the 1990s a new 
focus on private-service provision appeared in ECEC policy with the aim to 
increase parental choice, diversity, and efficiency in the system. Particularly in 
Sweden, the space for market processes has, however, remained limited. 
Strict fee regulations and public funding of ECEC services, whether public or 
private, make price competition impossible, and high quality standards 
concerning staff training, ECEC activities, and facilities curb profit margins 
even further. Some commentators have even pointed to tendencies towards 
self-exploitation among small private providers to keep their businesses 
running (Bergqvist & Nyberg, 2001). Nor did marketization imply decreased 
state involvement: public funding for ECEC has remained high, among the 
highest in the OECD (2007). Furthermore, while the number of commercial 
providers has increased continuously, the expansion of public places was 
greater. The changes in Swedish early-years provision with respect to 
marketization were thus incremental and did not lead to the dismantling of the 
public ECEC system. Should the number of for-profit providers increase to a 
more substantial proportion, this could eventually challenge the public 
organization and underlying social-rights logic of Swedish ECEC services.  
 
In the UK, the trends of marketization in ECEC provision were more 
pronounced. While the development of a childcare market for children of 
working parents was of a more unplanned nature during the 1970s, NPM 
ideas introduced under the Conservative government in the 1980s paved the 
way for the marketization of ECEC governance, which also occurred in other 
parts of the public sector at that time. It was, however, first under New Labour 
in the 1990s when the rise of social-investment discourse made ECEC service 
expansion part of an economically oriented policy agenda. ECEC services in 
this model play an important role for welfare-state sustainability and economic 
growth by bringing parents into employment, lifting families out of poverty, and 
by giving children a good educational foundation so that they become 
productive workers in an internationally competitive knowledge economy. 
Nevertheless, despite the strong preference for the market model, the UK 
government did not retreat from the scene. To the contrary, a pronounced 
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increase in state involvement can be observed since the 1980s. On the one 
hand, the childcare market did not grow by itself (Lloyd, 2008), but service 
expansion had to be promoted by the state by means of various measures. 
Secondly, the state had to mitigate negative market effects with respect to 
availability, affordability, and quality via targeted measures, demand-side 
subsidies to parents – who nevertheless shouldered the bulk of childcare 
costs – and standards and inspection regimes. An unexpected side effect of 
the market approach has been the increase in state regulation and 
centralization, which is evident in the very detailed and prescriptive English 
preschool curriculum (DfCSF, 2008).  
 
In Sweden, we find a contrary development since the 1990s with the 
decentralization of ECEC governance and the relaxing of state regulations. 
For example, the Swedish preschool curriculum is only a few pages long, 
comprising mainly mission statements and broad objectives (Lpfö, 1998). 
Indeed, many municipalities do not even set requirements for ECEC providers 
concerning staff-to-children ratios or the like (Skolverket, 2008). Yet these 
reforms cannot be associated with a ‘free-market’ logic because they were 
attempts to strengthen local self-administration. The state is still the central 
player, albeit with a much enhanced role for local governments. Marketization 
and decentralization have led to greater variations in the ECEC system, and 
have therewith challenged its universalism. Nevertheless, Swedish ECEC 
stands out as displaying a high degree of equality from an international 
perspective (OECD, 2006). This may be a result of the strong and long-
established normative underpinnings of a system that emphasizes ‘public 
good’ and the social-rights aspects of early-years services. 
 
The most dominant trend in Sweden dating back to the 1970s has 
consequently been the universalization of early-years services that followed 
the concept of integrated ‘educare’ which combines the aims of supporting the 
reconciliation of family and work with children’s early education. This model 
has not been abandoned but reinforced in recent years, with massive 
increases in public ECEC services and the extension of a statutory right to a 
place for all children aged one to six. The underlying logic since the 1970s has 
been the gradual expansion of citizenship rights, including women’s rights to 
equal access to employment and children’s rights to a good upbringing and 
equal educational opportunities (Naumann, 2006). Developments in this 
direction have also taken place in the UK, though much more recently and 
relatively modest in extent, with universal part-time preschool for three- to 
four-year-olds, and particularly with the broader orientation towards universal 
‘educare’ in Children’s Centres.  
 
Some scholars have interpreted the limited nature of universal preschool 
education in the UK as an incoherent implementation of the governments’ 
social-investment agenda, because it ensures neither education for all children 
nor adequate support for employed parents (Jenson & Saint-Denis, 2006; 
Lewis, 2003). However, while limited implementation may hamper the yielding 
of expected returns, the ‘social-investment’ logic in itself does not lead to 
universal social rights. From an instrumental-investment orientation it might be 
neither economically nor politically sound to provide universal ECEC for all 
children: post-industrial societies are not only knowledge economies but 
display large low-skill and low-pay service sectors. Providing all children with 
good ECEC would raise expectations, and could potentially create political 
tensions and demands for social and economic change should the economy 
prove unable to provide adequate employment for all well-educated children. 
My point here is that the introduction of universal preschool education and 
universal Children’s Centres were driven by a different older, social-rights 
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logic. Claims around gender equality and children’s well-being and education 
had been around for a long time in the UK, just as in Sweden, but without their 
transformation into policy. The social-investment discourse then opened the 
opportunities for feminists and children’s rights advocates to influence ECEC 
policy and to broaden its remit in areas where they had been unsuccessful in 
the past (Wincott, 2006).  
 
Also, in the Swedish case we could argue that ‘social-investment’ ideas 
created opportunities for ECEC services to develop, but long before the 
1990s. The link between ECEC services and ‘productivist’ welfare-state goals 
(i.e., raising children to become productive citizen-workers) goes a long way 
back to conceptions of ‘preventive social policy’ that were constitutive of the 
Swedish welfare state in the 1930s (Myrdal, 1945). Swedish ECEC service 
expansion in the 1970s and 1990s was also motivated by the government’s 
interest in increasing employment rates and state revenue (Naumann, 2006). 
The Swedish approach to social investment has, however, always been 
integrated with a redistributive-citizenship conception of service provision (see 
Esping-Andersen, 2002). 
Conclusion 
 
This examination of recent policy developments in the field of early-years 
services in Sweden and the UK has revealed that marketization is not the only 
trend common to such provisions in both countries. Another important driver 
for reform has been the extension of children’s rights to early childhood 
education. Further developments include shifts in the relation between central 
and local governments in ECEC governance that cannot easily be attributed to 
either marketization or universalization trends. Thus, a general summation is 
that service-sector reforms are more complex than the controversy between 
‘state’ and ‘market’ in policy debates may suggest. A second, more specific 
finding stands out: while both economic and rights-based ideas have shaped 
policy goals in Sweden and the UK, it matters which policy reforms came first. 
In Sweden, on the one hand, market mechanisms were introduced into a well-
established, fairly universal public ECEC system, with limited effects on the 
overall system; in the UK, on the other hand, ideas about universal access to 
ECEC became prominent after a ‘childcare market’ had already been created, 
and the instruments chosen to support this market (i.e., demand-side 
subsidies) limited the possibility to expand public-service provision. Universal 
preschool access in the UK is thus of a rather limited nature. The tensions 
between political promises to ‘invest in children’, all children, and actual policy 
implementation may, however, produce pressures for further change towards 
a more universal model.  
 
Central to this article, therefore, is the observation that policy developments in 
welfare states continue to be shaped by historical trajectories, but not in a 
steady and linear fashion; nor do they evolve neatly from one ‘paradigm’ or 
‘regime’ to another, but may include the maturation of ‘old’ welfare-state 
promises alongside the exploration of new paths. An investigation of the 
interplay between different underlying logics and goals of policy reform and 
the resultant dynamics of change may be a fruitful focus for future research on 
the restructuring of welfare states. 
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